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The Dollar and Policy Options
The phenomenal strength ofthe dollar in the
foreign exchange markets - rising more than 50
percent on a trade-weighted average basis
against other currencies since mid-1980 - has
raised concern both here and abroad. On the
one hand, U.S. business and government offi-
cials are chafing at the decline in U.S. interna-
tional competitiveness that has resulted in a
record $107 billion trade deficit in 1984. On the
other hand, foreign officials are concerned
about the inflationary pressures arising from the
higher domestic cost of imports caused by the
decline in the value oftheir currencies against
the dollar.
Against this background, the finance ministers of
the UnitedStates, Great Britain, France, Germany
and Japan met in Washington in January and
issued astatement reiteratingtheircommitmentto
coordinated intervention in the currency markets
"whenever it is deemed helpful." Marketcom-
mentators interpreted the statement as signalIing a
significantdeparture from the established U.S.
policyofminimal intervention, that is, interven-
tion only to counteract disorderlyconditions in
theforeign exchange market. Manyhoped thatthe
Federal Reserve would now actively intervene to
haltthe dollar's rise by large dollar sales in the
foreign exchange market. This Letter considers
the efficacy and desirabilityofusing foreign
exchange market intervention and, more gen-
erally, monetary policyto bringthe dollar
exchange rate down.
Sterilized intervention
An exchange intervention involves acentral
bank's open market purchase orsale ofa foreign
currency against the domestic currency. Besides
its impacton the exchange rate, the action also
affects bank reserves in the same way as the cen-
tral bank's domestic open-market operations. For
instance, when the Federal Reserve purchases the
German markwith dollars, it injects reserves into
the bankingsystem justas aFederal Reserve open-
market purchase ofdomestic securities does.
Thus, an exchange intervention has a monetary
dimension as well as a pureexchange market
dimension.
The pure exchange marketeffect can be con-
ceived as arising from a sterilized exchange
intervention, that is, one in which the monetary
effect is offset by a domestic open-market opera-
tion. In the example above, a sterilized Federal
Reserve purchase ofGerman marks would be one
that is coupled with a simultaneous open-market
sale of U.S. securities to "mopup" the additional
liquidity injected intothe banking system bythe
exchange intervention. Whenthe Federal Reserve
buys marks in the foreign exchange market, it
invests the proceeds in interest-bearing, mark-.
denominated securities. The public holds fewer
mark-denominated securities and more dollar
deposits as aconsequence. These additional dollar
holdingsofthe public, in turn, are replaced by
U.S. securities when the Federal Reserve under-
takes an open market securities sale. The net
outcomeofa sterilized intervention operation to
support the German mark, therefore, is thatthe
public asa whole holds fewer mark-denominated
securities and more dollar-denominated securities.
Investors may not be indifferentaboutthe
"currency mix" ofsecurities in their portfolios,
however. Ifthey do have other preferences, they
will try to restore their portfolios by buying mark-
denominated securities and sellingdollar-denom-
inated securities. This will tend to placedownward
pressure on the dollar and cause itto depreciate.
Hence, whether a sterilized exchange interven-
tion can have a significant and lasting effect on
exchange rates depends on the extent to which
the two types of securities substitute for each
other in private portfolios. Ifthey were perfect
substitutes, there would be little or no effect on
the exchange rate; for investors indifferent to the
currency mix of securities, shifts in their relative
supply caused by intervention operations would
not matter. In contrast, the less the two securities
are substitutable for one another, the greater the
likely effect of sterilized exchange intervention
on the exchange rate.
Empirical studies find, notsurprisingly, that secu-
rities denominated in different currencies are not
perfect substitutes for one another. Thus the ques-
tion becomes, how large is the effectofsterilizedFRBSF
exchange intervention? Besides the degree to
which assets can be substituted forone another,
the magnitude ofthe effect should also depend
on the size ofthe intervention relative to the total
size ofthe securities in the public's aggregate
portfolio. Purely on apriori grounds, in viewof
the huge aggregate stock ofdomestic and foreign
securities outstanding in private portfolios, it is
hard to see howany realistic magnitudes ofex-
change intervention by majorcentral banks,
either in isolation or as a coordinated group, can
have a lasting effect on exchange rates.
This inference has been borne outat least in part
by empirical investigations. Atthe Versailles Eco-
nomic Summit in 1982, the heads ofstate of
major industrial nations ordered a jointstudy by
their central banks on the effects ofexchange
intervention on the exchange market. In the
reportthat was issued in April 1983, the Working
Group stated after extensivestatistical studies that
there was little evidence ofa significant lasting
impactduring normal times. More specifically,
the report found thatduringepisodes ofgreat
turmoil in the exchange market-for instance, in
October 1978-coordinated intervention by
major central banks was able to restore orderly
market conditions. However, for the longer
period since the beginning offloating exchange
rates in 1973, there was little evidence ofa sys-
tematic relationship between sterilized exchange
interventions and exchange-rate changes, despite
the many episodes ofheavy interventions by the
major central banks.
Monetary policy
The monetarydimension ofexchange interven-
tion, or "unsterilized" intervention, is likelyto
have a larger effect on the exchange rate, how-
ever. In the aforementioned case, ifthe Federal
Reserve purchase ofGerman marks is allowed to
increase U.S. bank reserves, the effecton the
money supply is similarto that ofdomestic open-
market securities purchases.
A monetary stimulus is likelyto depreciate the
value ofthe dollarquite significantly through two
channels: prices and real interest rates. Because
prices adjust slowly, real liquidity in the economy
initiallyexpands in proportion to the rise in
money growth. This causes real interest rates to
fall and leads todollardepreciation as dollar
investments become less attractive compared to
investments abroad.
The initial fall ofthe dollar takes place in both
nominal and real (adjusted for domestic and
foreign relative prices) terms, and therefore
translates into a rise in the international com-
petitiveness of U.S. exports. The second round
of adjustment begins to eliminate the improve-
ment in the U.S. competitive position, how.ever.
As prices begin to rise in response to more rapid
money growth, real liquidity falls. The fall in real
liquidity, in turn, puts upward pressure on real
interest rates and the real value of the dollar.
Higher real rates again make the dollar an at-
tractive investment.
Most empirical work suggests that a rise in the
rate ofmoney growth is fully reflected in a higher
domestic price level after approximately two
years. Moreover, even the temporary dollar de-
preciation in real terms only improves the U.S.
trade balance with a considerable lag. Empirical
studies find that the trade balance improves
about six months after a dollar depreciation and
keeps on improving for up to two years. As the
real value ofthe dollar gradually appreciates
back to its initial level, however, the trade-
improvement effect also wears off-largely by
the end ofthe third year following the initial
monetary stimulus.
This suggests that although a monetary expansion
could bring about adollardepreciation fairly
quickly, its intended effects would be transitory.
Against this short-term gain, one mustweigh the
costs to society ofa potential rekindling ofinfla-tion caused bythe substantial acceleration of
money-growth rates that would be needed to
bringaboutasignificantdepreciationofthedollar
exchange rate. Consideringthe hard-won gains in
bringingdown the public's "inflation psychology"
in recent years, taking this risk is difficultto justify.
Moreover, pastexperienceboth in this countryand
abroad shows that repeated attempts atexploiting
this short-term gain would soon see itdisappear.
Finally, many analysts believe thatatthe heartof
thedollar'srise, at leastoverthepasttwoyears, is a
"real side" phenomenonthatis associated withthe
rise in the federal governmentbudgetdeficitand
that is not monetary in nature. A long-run solution
to the problem, therefore, lies outside the realm of
Federal Reserve policies, and must be sought in a
resolution ofthe federal budgetdeficitproblem.
Hang-ShengChengand Michael Hutchison
MONETARY POLICYOBJECTIVES FOR 1985
Federal Reserve Chairman PauIVolcker presented a report tothe Congress on the Federal
Reserve's monetarypolicyobjectivesfor 1985 on February20. The report includes asummaryof
the Federal Reserve's monetary policy plans along with a review ofeconomic and financial
developments in 1984 and the economic outlook in 1985. Single or multiple copies ofthe report
can be obtained upon request from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco, CA 94120; phone (415) 974-2246.
Opinionsexpressed in this newsletterdo not necessarily reflect theviewsofthemanagementofthe Federal Reserve Bank ofSan
Francisco, orofthe Board ofGovernorsofthe Federal Reserve System.
Editorialcommentsmaybeaddressedtotheeditor(GregoryTong) ortotheauthor....FreecopiesofFederal Reserve publications
can be obtainedfrom the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millionsl











Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 187,541 - 628 12,177 6.9
Loans and Leases1 6 169,340 - 717 14,230 9.2
Commercial and Industrial 52,070 - 208 5,894 12.8
Real estate 62,163 148 2,567 4.3
Loans to Individuals 32,494 24 5,666 21.1
Leases 5,292 3 282 5.6
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,116 79 - 1,194 - 9.7
OtherSecurities2 7,085 10 - 857 - 10.8
Total Deposits 192,818 - 930 7,499 4.0
Demand Deposits 44,182 - 782 130 0.3
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 30,246 547 469 1.6
OtherTransaction Balances4 12,903 - 323 888 7.4
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 135,733 176 6,481 5.0
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 43,628 195 3,527 8.7
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 39,114 - 69 1,219 3.2
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 20,371 757 - 249 - 1.2
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+l/Deficiency(-l
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accountswith telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
7 Annualized percent change